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Plaintiff StubHub, Inc. (“StubHub”) brings this action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, and under California state law, against Defendants Golden State 
Warriors, LLC (“Warriors”) and Ticketmaster L.L.C. (“Ticketmaster”), and alleges – upon 
knowledge with respect to its own acts and those it has witnessed first-hand, and upon information 
and belief with respect to all other matters – as follows:  
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. This case concerns an anticompetitive scheme designed and employed by the Golden 
State Warriors and its exclusive ticketing partner Ticketmaster to create and exploit a captured 
monopoly Secondary Ticket Exchange by illegally excluding competition from providers of 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services.  The Warriors and Ticketmaster have attempted to effectuate 
their monopolistic goal by forcing Warriors fans to use only Secondary Ticket Exchange services 
provided by the Warriors, through Ticketmaster, for the resale of Warriors tickets.  They have set out 
to achieve this illegal outcome for a single purpose:  to reap service fees and profits that they could 
not earn in a competitive Secondary Ticket Exchange environment.  These conspiratorial actions 
have harmed and will continue to substantially harm Warriors fans, Plaintiff StubHub and 
competition in the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets. 
2. The Warriors possess a monopoly over the sale of primary or “first sale” Warriors 
tickets, all of which are sold through Ticketmaster’s dominant primary Ticketing Platform.  If you 
are a Warriors fan and you want season tickets, you have one choice:  buy them through 
Ticketmaster.   
3. There is, however, a substantial and separate resale market for Warriors tickets 
which, of necessity, involves the use of Secondary Ticket Exchange services.  To control and profit 
from the resale of Warriors tickets through such Exchanges, the Warriors and Ticketmaster have 
cancelled or threatened to cancel fan ticket subscriptions to Warriors season and post-season tickets 
if fans choose to resell their Warriors tickets over a Secondary Ticketing Exchange that competes 
with Ticketmaster’s, such as the one operated by Plaintiff StubHub.  In short, Defendants have 
offered a Hobson’s Choice to Warriors fans:  use Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange 
exclusively or forfeit your Warriors tickets altogether.  To Warriors fans, this is effectively no choice 
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at all.  Defendants have reinforced and exacerbated the impact of this exclusionary conduct by 
misleading consumers about the authenticity of Warriors tickets sold on reputable, competing 
Secondary Ticket Exchanges and by engaging in other conduct that is intended to, and has had the 
effect of, artificially raising the costs of competing exchanges for no legitimate competitive purpose.   
4. As a result of Defendants’ anticompetitive campaign, there has been substantial 
foreclosure in the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services, harming consumers, competition 
and StubHub.  Until recently, StubHub has been a robust competitor in providing efficient 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets.  Numerous Warriors fans historically have 
chosen to utilize StubHub for Secondary Ticket Exchange services because of its superior customer 
service, substantial brand equity, competitive pricing, customer protection and guarantees of timely 
ticket delivery and validity.  However, Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, as more fully alleged 
herein, has precluded StubHub from continuing to provide Secondary Ticket Exchange services to 
an ever-expanding number of Warriors fans.  The graph below demonstrates just how substantial the 
impact of Defendants’ anticompetitive practices has been, causing the number of listings for 
Warriors tickets on StubHub to decrease by approximately 80% in the last year alone.  
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5. StubHub’s listings of Warriors tickets, and the listings of Warriors tickets offered 
through other Secondary Ticket Exchanges, will drop even further if Defendants’ anticompetitive 
scheme is not stopped.  Indeed, if Defendants are not prevented from continuing their 
anticompetitive practices, Ticketmaster will become the only Secondary Ticket Exchange through 
which Warriors tickets will be sold – just as it has been the only Primary Ticket Platform through 
which Warriors tickets (and tickets to most other large events in the United States) have been sold 
for years.   
6. What this means for both buyers and sellers of secondary Warriors tickets is fewer 
and more costly options for Secondary Ticket Exchange services and, ultimately, only a single 
option for such services – Ticketmaster.  It also means, and has already led to, reduced output for the 
resale of Golden State Warriors tickets.  And it means, and has already led to, higher Secondary 
Ticket Exchange service fees imposed on Warriors fans and fewer innovations in the delivery of 
these services.   
7. Ticketmaster also has engaged in a number of other unfair practices to deprive 
consumers of access to Secondary Ticket Exchanges other than its own.  It has, for example, refused 
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to deliver tickets to fans who have purchased them over Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform 
until only a few days before the relevant event, delaying the delivery of their tickets for weeks or 
even months.  Ticketmaster has done this to prevent these fans from reselling their tickets on 
competing Secondary Ticket Exchanges.   
8. There are no legitimate or offsetting procompetitive benefits that justify Defendants’ 
conduct in harming competition in Secondary Ticket Exchange services. 
9. StubHub challenges this conduct as a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act and of California’s Cartwright Act.  StubHub also challenges it as involving unlawful and/or 
unfair business acts or practices under California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, as 
well as tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.  Through this action, StubHub 
seeks to permanently enjoin Defendants from continuing to engage in this anticompetitive scheme 
and to recover treble damages for the injuries it has suffered therefrom. 
10. If the anticompetitive actions complained of herein are not stopped, Ticketmaster is 
likely to seek to replicate them with other teams and entertainment venues throughout the United 
States, restricting more consumers to a single Secondary Ticket Exchange and forcing competitors 
and innovators, such as StubHub, to exit the business.  As a result,  millions of Americans will find 
themselves captive to a monopoly Secondary Ticket Exchange unconstrained in its ability to charge 
supra-competitive prices for lower quality services.   
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE  
11. StubHub brings this action under Sections 4 and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 15 and 16, for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2.  
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. 
12. StubHub also brings this action under California’s Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 16720, et seq. and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., to 
obtain restitution, recover statutory damages, and injunctive relief.  And StubHub brings this action 
under state law prohibiting tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.  This Court 
has supplemental jurisdiction over these pendant California state law claims under 
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1367 because the claims arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as 
the federal antitrust law claims.   
13. Venue is proper in this District under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to StubHub’s claims 
occurred in this District, and each Defendant transacts business and/or maintains facilities in this 
District and thus is subject to personal jurisdiction here.  Defendants are engaged in interstate 
commerce, and their activities, including those that form the basis of this complaint, substantially 
impact interstate commerce. 
III. THE PARTIES 
A. Plaintiff 
14. Plaintiff StubHub is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Delaware.  
Its principal place of business is 199 Freemont Street, San Francisco, California 94105.  It is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of eBay Inc. 
15. Founded in 2000, StubHub provides Secondary Ticket Exchange services to resellers 
and purchasers of tickets available by resale.  As discussed more fully below, unlike the sale of 
primary tickets, which are made by the teams themselves (directly or through agents), exchange 
services are essential to the functioning of the resale ticket business.  Secondary Ticket Exchanges 
offer network services that efficiently and reliably “match” holders of tickets to sporting events, 
concerts and other forms of live entertainment who wish to resell their tickets with individuals 
looking to purchase such tickets.   
16. StubHub uses an electronic exchange through which the sale and purchase of tickets 
are made.  It charges competitive services fees for such services, offers efficient and quality delivery 
mechanisms and other forms of useful customer services both to resellers and buyers as well as a 
reliable and valuable Fan Protect Guarantee.  It therefore enjoys an extremely positive reputation 
among both ticket resellers and buyers of tickets available by resale. 
17. Among the types of tickets sold and purchased on StubHub’s Secondary Ticket 
Exchange are tickets for Warriors basketball games at the Oracle Arena in Oakland, California.   
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B. Defendants 
18. Defendant Warriors owns the Golden State Warriors NBA professional basketball 
team.  It is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of California with its 
principal place of business at 1011 Broadway, Oakland, California 94607.  The Warriors is an NBA 
franchise and has an ownership interest in the NBA.  The team is covered by the Ticketmaster 
agreements for Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary Ticket Exchange services that were 
negotiated by the NBA. 
19. Defendant Ticketmaster is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Live Nation Entertainment, 
Inc.  It is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of Virginia with its 
principal place of business at 7060 Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood, California 90028.  
Ticketmaster is the largest ticketing company and the dominant provider of Primary Ticket Platform 
services in the U.S. with 2014 revenues of approximately $1.55 billion.  Ticketmaster, through its 
TicketExchange, TicketsNow and TM+ brands, also provides Secondary Ticket Exchange services 
in the U.S.   
20. Ticketmaster has exclusive, league-wide deals with the NBA, NFL, and NHL for both 
Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary Ticket Exchange services as well as numerous other 
exclusive deals for these services at concert venues across the country.  Ticketmaster has been the 
exclusive provider of Primary Ticket Platform services for the Warriors for many years, and has 
been the exclusive Secondary Ticket Exchange partner of the Warriors (via Ticketmaster’s 
agreement with the NBA) since August 2012.  As discussed more fully below, as part of the 
exclusive Secondary Ticket Exchange partnership that Ticketmaster has with the Warriors, the 
Warriors promote Ticketmaster as their only “official” Secondary Ticket Exchange and refuse to 
allow any other Secondary Ticket Exchange to integrate technically with the Primary Ticket 
Platform operated by Ticketmaster and used by the Warriors.  In addition, Ticketmaster is the only 
“authorized” channel through which Warriors’ season ticket holders may sell their tickets.  
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C. Co-conspirators 
21. Upon information and belief, various persons, firms, corporations, organization 
and/or other business entities, have participated as co-conspirators in the violations alleged herein 
and have performed acts in furtherance of these conspiracies. 
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Primary Ticket Platform Services 
22. Primary Ticket Platform providers, such as Ticketmaster, contract with teams to 
provide distribution and support services for primary ticket sales.  These are sales made at “face 
value” directly by the team to fans on a season ticket or individual game basis.  The majority of these 
sales are made over the Internet, but they may also be made through the phone, mobile devices, 
ticket outlets, and the box office.  Primary Ticket Platforms are responsible for managing all aspects 
of the primary ticket sale and distribution process. 
23. Fans who seek to buy Warriors season tickets virtually always buy them through the 
Ticketmaster Primary Ticket Platform, as it is extremely difficult to find resellers that supply season 
ticket packages.  Approximately 75% of Warriors tickets are sold as season ticket packages and 
virtually all of these are sold through Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform.  The remaining 
Warriors tickets are sold as part of more limited packages, group sales and individual tickets - all 
through Ticketmaster.   
24. The overall price a consumer pays for a primary Warriors ticket generally includes 
the face value of the ticket plus any number of “service,” “convenience,” “processing,” and/or 
“delivery” fees added on by Ticketmaster.  These additional Primary Ticket Platform fees can 
constitute a substantial portion of the overall cost of the ticket to the consumer.  
25. Primary Ticket Platform providers typically enter into multi-year contracts with the 
leagues, teams or venues hosting the events.  In return for the right to sell their tickets, the Primary 
Ticket Platform provider shares with them a portion of the Primary Ticket Platform fees that it 
collects on the ticket sale.  
26. Ticketmaster, through its participation in a contract negotiated by the NBA on behalf 
of its members teams, has been the only provider of Primary Ticket Platform services for Warriors 
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tickets for many years.  Warriors’ fans cannot purchase primary tickets to Warriors regular season or 
playoff games without conducting the transaction through Ticketmaster.  Ticketmaster is also the 
only provider of Primary Ticket Platform services for 25 other NBA teams; for all 32 NFL teams;1 
for 25 or the 30 NHL teams; and for the majority of major concert venues. 
27. Ticketmaster has had long-standing dominance in Primary Ticket Platform markets.  
In fact, a principal reason that the U.S., California and sixteen other states sued to block the merger 
between Ticketmaster and Live Nation in January 2010 was because of Ticketmaster’s dominance in 
providing these services.  In its complaint to enjoin the transaction, the government emphasized that 
“[f]or over two decades, Ticketmaster has been the dominant [Primary Ticket Platform] service 
provider in the U.S.”  One of the government’s chief concerns was that the merged entity would 
leverage Ticketmaster’s market power in Primary Ticket Platform services to large concert venues to 
require these venues to use Live Nation for concert promotion services.  As part of its agreement to 
allow the merger to proceed, the government prohibited the merged entity from leveraging 
Ticketmaster’s market power in this way. 
28. This was not the only run-in Ticketmaster has had with the government in connection 
with Ticketmaster’s actual or threatened abuse of its dominance in various Primary Ticket Platform 
services.  In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission sued Ticketmaster for leveraging its market power 
in certain Primary Ticket Platform services to unfairly and deceptively steer consumers to use 
Ticketmaster for overpriced Secondary Ticket Exchange services.  Specifically, when consumers 
sought to purchase primary tickets from Ticketmaster for certain concerts, Ticketmaster directed 
them unknowingly to Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange site where it sold tickets at 
substantially higher prices – up to quadruple the face value.  Ticketmaster ultimately settled with the 
government after, among other things, agreeing to pay refunds to the affected consumers and stop 
engaging in the challenged “bait and switch” activity. 
                                                 
1  Ticketmaster only provides Primary Ticket Platform services to the Detroit Lions for season ticket 
sales. 
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B. Secondary Ticket Exchange Services   
29. Secondary Ticket Exchange services providers, such as StubHub, Ticketmaster and 
Vivid Seats—provide network distribution and support services for ticket resales.  Ticket resales are 
not made by the team or entity hosting the event, but by a person or entity that already has purchased 
the ticket.  The overall payment made for the resale ticket is based on the price for the ticket – 
determined by the reseller and not the Exchange, plus any service fees that the Secondary Ticket 
Exchange charges.   Depending on the popularity of the particular team, game or event, the resale 
ticket price may be substantially lower or substantially higher than the face value price paid for the 
primary ticket.   
30. There are many reasons why purchasers of Warriors tickets may want to resell their 
tickets.  They may be unable to attend the game because of an unexpected scheduling conflict or 
illness.  They may no longer want to attend the game because of a lack of enthusiasm or interest if 
the team is performing poorly.  Or they may simply want to resell the tickets to earn a profit or 
otherwise subsidize or allow for their purchase of additional tickets, as is often the case with season 
ticket holders.   
31. There are likewise many reasons why consumers choose to purchase Warriors tickets 
by resale.  The game might be sold out or the desired tickets might otherwise be unavailable from 
the Primary Ticket Platform.  Or the purchaser might be able to find a better price or seat on the 
secondary exchange. 
32. Secondary Ticket Exchanges are an essential part of the ticket resale process.  They 
perform a “matchmaking” function between resellers and resale ticket buyers.  Without such 
exchanges, it would be extremely costly for prospective resellers and purchasers of resale tickets to 
locate one another or to assess overall supply and demand for the resale of tickets.  In addition, 
Secondary Ticket Exchanges are able to effectively eliminate the otherwise high cost and risk 
incurred by buyers of resale tickets that are involved in determining the legitimacy of the reseller.  
Such exchanges, therefore, satisfy the twin demands of resellers and resale ticket purchasers, and 
make less costly and more efficient the process of putting potential resellers and buyers together.  
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They do this by offering resellers the widest possible audience of potential purchasers and, at the 
same time, offering potential purchasers the widest inventory of tickets available for resale. 
33. The network services offered by a particular Secondary Ticket Exchange, such as 
StubHub, becomes more valuable to potential ticket buyers as the number and quality of tickets 
listed on that Exchange by resellers increases.   Moreover, the network services offered by that 
Exchange becomes more attractive to resellers to the extent that more potential ticket buyers 
frequent the Exchange.  Conversely, the network benefits offered both to potential ticket buyers and 
sellers that utilize a given Secondary Ticket Exchange are reduced when fewer would-be sellers and 
buyers visit the site, resulting in reduced quantities and varieties of available seats and fewer 
purchasers interested in obtaining them.  
34. The innovations offered by Secondary Ticket Exchanges and StubHub in particular 
have not always been available to fans.  Prior to the turn of the century, many states had what were 
referred to as “anti-scalping” laws, which barred the reselling of primary tickets or restricted the 
terms under which they could be resold.  Virtually all states have since rescinded these rules, 
recognizing the many consumer benefits of allowing ticket resales.   
35. After the repeal of these reseller prohibition laws, the majority of ticket resales were 
made by small resellers with limited ticket inventory.  Secondary sales, at this time, were not robust 
because sellers confronted substantial costs for advertising their inventory, and purchasers had to 
invest substantial costs into finding secondary tickets that they wanted to buy.   
36. Then StubHub came along.  StubHub helped to solve these cost issues for buyers and 
resellers and, in turn, helped to spark substantial growth in secondary sales.  Through StubHub’s 
strong Internet presence, its consumer-oriented approach, and its various innovations that 
substantially reduce fraud and increase consumer confidence in its Secondary Ticket Exchange 
transactions, consumers came to trust and rely upon StubHub for Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services.   StubHub helped to transform reselling from an often unreliable and economically 
dangerous activity to a legitimate and safe one. 
37. With the growing consumer demand for conducting secondary ticket transactions 
through Secondary Ticket Exchanges that StubHub has been in the forefront of establishing, and 
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concerned with the threat that StubHub posed to Ticketmaster’s longtime control of ticketing, 
Ticketmaster entered the Secondary Ticket Exchange business during the last decade.  Ticketmaster 
is now a substantial and growing provider of Secondary Ticket Exchange services.  However, that 
growth has not been the result of innovation or price competition.  Rather, as explained hereafter, 
Ticketmaster’s growth has come from its efforts to force consumers to use Ticketmaster exclusively 
for online ticket resale.  This is particularly true for Warriors’ tickets, where the Warriors and 
Ticketmaster jointly have engaged in various tactics to foreclose Secondary Ticket Exchange 
competition. 
C. Defendants’ Foreclosure of Secondary Ticket Exchange Competition for 
Warriors Tickets 
38. Since 2012, the Warriors and Ticketmaster have had an exclusive arrangement 
pursuant to which they share service fees for secondary ticket transactions completed over 
Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange.  Hence, Ticketmaster and the Warriors get two bites at 
collecting services fees associated with Warriors ticket sales – once when the ticket is originally 
sold, and again when the primary purchaser resells the ticket over the Secondary Ticket Exchange 
operated by Ticketmaster. 
39. The Warriors and Ticketmaster have set out to capture additional supra-competitive 
profits from their exclusive Secondary Ticket Exchange relationship, but not by offering a superior 
product or lower prices.  Instead, they have taken a series of interconnected, anticompetitive actions 
with the intended purpose, and resulting effect, of excluding competing Secondary Ticket Exchange 
providers such as StubHub.  
40. In particular, as an integral part of this anticompetitive scheme, Defendants have 
begun to contractually require that any resale of Warriors season tickets be done only through the 
Secondary Ticket Exchange operated by Ticketmaster on behalf of the Warriors.  To enforce and 
reinforce that contractual commitment, Defendants have (1) explicitly precluded, or threatened to 
preclude, season ticket holders from purchasing primary season tickets or playoff tickets unless they 
agree to resell exclusively on Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange; (2) begun monitoring 
season ticket holders’ resales and cancelling season ticket subscriptions for those ticket holders that 
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have used competing Secondary Ticket Exchanges, such as StubHub; (3) engaged in a false and 
misleading advertising campaign designed to cast doubt upon the reliability and authenticity of 
tickets purchased on competing Secondary Ticket Exchanges, particularly StubHub; and (4) denied 
competing Secondary Ticket Exchanges, including StubHub, the ability to technologically integrate 
with Ticketmaster’s primary sales platform unnecessarily raising their costs of providing a safe and 
secure resale exchange. 
1. Defendants’ Forcing of Ticket Holders to Use Ticketmaster Exclusively for Resale. 
41. The Warriors, as part of an agreement with Ticketmaster, have refused to sell or 
threatened to refuse to sell Warriors season and/or playoff tickets to season ticket holders, unless the 
season ticket holders agree to use Ticketmaster exclusively for Secondary Ticket Exchange services.  
The Warriors have explicitly forced this contractual provision upon ticket purchasers as part of the 
“Terms and Conditions” to which every Warriors season ticket holder must agree.  Specifically, the 
Warriors “Non-Transferability” rule states:  “Sale or resale of any [Warriors] tickets by unauthorized 
means is prohibited . . . .  Authorized resale of your tickets via online means is limited to 
[Ticketmaster’s] NBAtickets.com.”  [Emphasis added].  Although there is no ambiguity in these 
restrictions, one season ticket holder asked the Warriors to confirm what they considered an 
“unauthorized means” of selling secondary tickets.  The Warriors responded:  “Any tickets being 
resold outside” of Ticketmaster.” 
42. In addition to this explicit contractual restriction, the Warriors also have directly 
threatened ticket holders with season ticket cancellation on numerous occasions if those ticket 
holders did not resell their tickets through the Warriors Secondary Ticket Exchange, operated by 
Ticketmaster.  This has been confirmed by numerous season ticket holders who have been the 
subject of this retaliatory action for refusing (or at least trying to refuse) to comply with these 
restrictive sales practices.  As one ticket holder explained: 
Prior to the season, the Golden State Warriors had told us that they were forcing 
brokers to exclusively list on TM+, the official resale marketplace for the NBA.  We 
decided not to oblige and see what transpired.  Today (late-December 2014), I got a 
phone call from the Golden State Warriors concerning this same situation. . . .  For 
the 11 home games so far this season, our breakdown of TM+ sales were below their 
standards. . . .  If we followed their request from the beginning of the season, our 
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numbers should be 100% sold via TM+ across the board.  Given this disparity, the 
Golden State Warriors stated that if this number didn’t improve with our remaining 
inventory to close to 100%, we would not be given playoff invoices and not have the 
option to renew our seats for the upcoming season; but, if we were to oblige their 
current request and sell exclusively through TM+, our accounts would be ‘all set.’ . . . 
We have stopped listing on StubHub. 
43. According to one Warriors sales representative, they have been instructed to 
“hammer” home the point – sell outside of Ticketmaster, and we will cut you off.  In a 
communication with a season ticket holder, he stated:  “I have to make sure I hammer that ‘we have 
the option to offer playoff tickets and a renewal at the end of each season to all ticket holders.  
Moving forward, we would like you to sell tickets solely through NBAtickets.com [i.e., 
Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange].  Brokers who choose to go this route will be in better 
standing to continue business with the team.’” 
44. In some cases, the Warriors have specifically identified StubHub as being particularly 
off-limits and have warned season ticket holders even more forcefully that selling through StubHub 
would result in cancellation of the ticket holder’s Warriors ticket subscription.   
45. This restrictive resale policy also has been confirmed by numerous other season ticket 
holders, many of whom have complained to the Warriors that limiting their secondary sales to 
Ticketmaster significantly hinders their ability to make such sales.  As one season ticket holder 
recounted, when he told a Warriors representative that selling only through Ticketmaster “is tedious 
and borderline impossible for the amount of seats that I have,” the representative pushed back 
intractably:  “Well, you’d better figure out how to get on [Ticketmaster’s] Tickets Now quickly.”  
According to the season ticketholder, “it was more of a threat than a suggestion or 
recommendation.” 
46. Another season ticket holder recalled a conversation with a Warriors’ representative 
in which he objected to this restrictive sales policy.  That ticket holder reported that the Warriors’ 
representative “didn’t care very much when I brought up the generally accepted view that their 
[Ticketmaster] site is a very inferior product, from both the buyer and sellers vantage point.”  The 
ticket holder went on to further note that this policy and the conduct enforcing it “seemed more like 
a Mafia tactic . . . than [that of] a supposedly fan friendly sports franchise.” 
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47. Other season ticket holders who similarly complained to the Warriors about its 
restrictive practices also have confirmed that the Warriors would not agree to rescind the policy 
when faced with ticket holder complaints.  To the contrary, in these conversations, the Warriors 
forced season ticket holders to acknowledge that they were complying with this restrictive policy.  
Specifically, the Warriors forced ticket holders to confirm that they had removed resale listings for 
Warriors tickets that they formerly had posted on Secondary Ticket Exchange sites that competed 
with the Warriors/Ticketmaster Exchange. 
2. Defendants’ Monitoring of Secondary Sales to Enforce Compliance with Their 
Restrictive Resale Policy. 
48. In order to ensure that their season ticket holders are complying with these restrictive 
ticketing practices, the Warriors and Ticketmaster now closely monitor secondary ticket transactions 
to identify and take action against those selling through StubHub and other competing Secondary 
Ticket Exchanges.  The Warriors have been very open with their season ticket holders about this 
new “Big Brother” tactic so they are fully aware that if they sell outside of Ticketmaster, the 
Warriors and Ticketmaster will know about it and bar them from future transactions. 
49. This open and pervasive monitoring effort has been confirmed by numerous season 
ticket holders in their communications, including their direct communications with the Warriors.  In 
those communications, it was stated that the Warriors wanted season ticket holders to resell through 
the Warriors/Ticketmaster Exchange and that the Warriors did not want to see tickets posted on 
other sites such as StubHub.  Moreover, the Warriors explicitly informed season ticket holders that 
both they and Ticketmaster would be monitoring resales throughout the season and again threatened 
that they “reserve[d] the right” not to offer 2015/16 renewals and 2015 playoff ticket access to ticket 
holders that did not comply with the Defendants’ restrictive sales policy.  For example, ticket 
holders reported in writing that: 
 The Golden State Warriors stated that by using actual seat data from 
[Ticketmaster’s] TM+, where they were able to see exact seat numbers, 
section, row and the price of tickets that were sold, they were able to see how 
many tickets we had sold via TM+.  This combined with sales data from 
StubHub . . . allowed them to cross reference how much inventory had been 
sold by each account. . . .  [The] Warriors stated that if this number didn’t 
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improve . . . to close to 100% [Ticketmaster], we would not be given playoff 
invoices and not have the option to renew our seats for the upcoming season. 
 
 The [Warriors/Ticketmaster] plan was to coerce season ticket holders into 
listing exclusively on the Warriors Ticketmaster exchange.  Their primary 
tactic will be to monitor Stubhub and some other exchanges, and when they 
see tickets on site, they will (and I paraphrase here) “Call the STH with a 
warning, and should the infractions continue, refuse to sell the STH any 
playoff tickets, and possibly not renew the following season.”   
50. The concerted efforts in which the Warriors and Ticketmaster have engaged to force 
ticket holders to use Ticketmaster exclusively for Secondary Ticket Exchange sales has had a direct 
and immediate impact on StubHub’s ability to compete in the Secondary Ticket Exchange market 
for Warriors tickets.  There has been an approximate 80 percent drop in StubHub’s Warriors 
inventory since Ticketmaster and the Warriors began imposing – by threats and monitoring and now 
contract – their exclusionary rule on the majority of their ticket holders.   
51. If this practice is allowed to continue, it likely will force StubHub and other providers 
of Secondary Ticket Exchange services to exit from the relevant Warriors Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services market altogether.  
3. Defendants’ Actions That Reinforce the Foreclosing Effect of Their Restrictive Resale 
Policy. 
52. Defendants also have taken additional steps to reinforce and exacerbate the 
exclusionary impact of their restrictive sales policy, including through deceptive communications 
aimed at competitors and further actions that have artificially inflated their costs of doing business. 
53. Under their exclusive arrangement, Ticketmaster is the only provider of Secondary 
Ticket Exchange services that the Warriors will market and promote to those seeking to buy or sell 
secondary tickets.  The marketing and promotion of Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange in 
this regard is substantial.  The official Warriors ticketing website 
(http://www.nba.com/warriors/tickets/single), states that it contains “the only 100% guaranteed 
official resale tickets posted by Warriors Season Ticket Holders in one place” (emphasis in 
original).  
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54. The Warriors and Ticketmaster have employed their joint marketing activities in an 
effort to mislead consumers into believing that Ticketmaster is the only safe or effective Secondary 
Ticket Exchange option they have, or the only one that can be trusted to provide a “guaranteed” or 
“official” Warriors ticket.  For example, on August 13, 2014, the Warriors issued a “fraud alert” for 
the 2013-14 season “warning fans about the potential dangers of purchasing single-game tickets for 
the 2014-15 season from a non-verified third party” and advising consumers to use only their 
“official” resale marketplace—Ticketmaster.  These actions reinforce and exacerbate the foreclosing 
effect of Defendants’ consumer forcing, demonstrate their specific intent to monopolize the market 
for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets, and make it more likely that 
Defendants’ actions will achieve their illegal ends. 
55. The Warriors agreement with Ticketmaster also provides that the Warriors will allow 
only Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange to technically integrate with their Primary Ticket 
Platform provider (which is also Ticketmaster).  Defendants have established this limitation not for 
any legitimate purpose designed to facilitate the efficient operation of primary or secondary sales.  
Rather, they have done it to further disadvantage equally-efficient or more efficient Secondary 
Ticket Exchange competitors by raising their costs of protecting against fraudulent sales.    
56. StubHub, in fact, utilizes substantial and reliable mechanisms to protect purchasers on 
its site.  It is a moderated marketplace that ensures that resellers who have previously engaged in 
deception are blocked from using the StubHub site.  StubHub also provides kiosks at or near the 
venues where ticket purchasers can obtain alternative inventory if they encounter a problem.  
Moreover, through its robust Fan Protect Guarantee, StubHub ensures that all buyers receive the 
ticket they purchased or their money back.  As a result of StubHub’s consumer friendly practices, 
incidences of fraud on StubHub’s are extremely minimal and consumers suffer the consequences of 
a fraud sale in only the rarest of cases.   
57. Defendants, however, suggest that their fraud protections are superior to those offered 
by Secondary Ticket Exchanges, such as StubHub.  They rely on their refusal to allow technical 
integration between Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform and competitive Secondary Ticket 
Exchanges willing to integrate, such as StubHub, to buttress their invalid claims of heightened 
Case3:15-cv-01436-VC   Document1   Filed03/29/15   Page17 of 35
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 -17- COMPLAINT
  Case No. 
 
security.  Were the Warriors genuinely concerned with security and authenticity issues, they could 
and would take steps to allow other networks to integrate technologically with its primary ticket 
platform.  But they do not.  Instead, they have agreed with Ticketmaster to leverage Ticketmaster’s 
position as the Primary Ticket Platform for the Warriors solely for the purpose of raising their rivals’ 
costs of providing these security services.   
V. RELEVANT MARKETS 
58. There are two relevant antitrust markets in this case:  the market for Warriors tickets 
sold through Primary Ticket Platforms, and the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for 
the resale of Warriors tickets.  Defendants have used their control over the former market to exclude 
competition and raise prices and reduce output in the latter market. 
A. Warriors Tickets Sold Through Primary Ticket Platforms 
59. The sale of Warriors tickets through Primary Ticket Platforms is a relevant market in 
this case.  There are no economic substitutes for Warriors tickets for Warriors fans, as these tickets 
provide entry into NBA games featuring the Warriors that are held at Oracle Arena.  Warriors’ fans 
who root for the likes of particular Warriors players – such as Stephen Curry, David Lee, or Klay 
Thompson – do not deem other NBA team tickets, such as tickets for the Sacramento Kings, to be a 
substitute for Warriors tickets, as those fans primarily root for the success of the Warriors.  Warriors 
fans would pay (and have paid) a small, but significant, non-transitory increase in price for Warriors 
tickets.  Indeed, the Warriors have increased season ticket prices by approximately 30% for next 
season, evidencing their confidence in the fact that Warriors fans will not substitute Warriors tickets 
for other entertainment products.  
60. Moreover, there are no economic substitutes for buying or selling Warriors tickets 
through Primary Ticket Platforms.  Primary Ticket Platforms offer a convenient medium through 
which fans purchase tickets directly from the Warriors.  Notably, all sales of Warriors season ticket 
packages are conducted through Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform.  And many consumers 
seek to purchase individual Warriors tickets via Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform because 
these tickets generally become available on that Primary Ticket Platform well before these tickets 
appear on Secondary Ticket Exchanges.   
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61.  In addition, from the Warriors’ perspective, Primary Ticket Platforms offer the only 
cost-effective way to reasonably manage and support the sale and distribution of primary Warriors 
tickets.  This is especially so given the volume of tickets and ticketholders associated with the 
typical Warriors game and season, the technology and hardware involved in running and maintaining 
the ticketing system, and the significant level of customer support necessary to handle problems, 
complaints, and inquiries from the thousands of ticketholders per game.    
62. Accordingly, both the Warriors selling the tickets, and the fans buying the tickets, 
have no reasonable alternative to which they could turn to buy or sell primary Warriors tickets.  In 
particular, there are no economic substitutes for Warriors tickets sold on a Primary Ticket Platform 
for Warriors fans.  A small, but significant, non-transitory price increase in Warriors tickets sold 
through a Primary Ticket Platform would not cause any significant amount of consumers to purchase 
Warriors tickets on a Secondary Ticket Exchange.  Consequently, a monopolist of Warriors tickets 
sold through Primary Platform Services (i.e., the Warriors) can profitably impose and has profitably 
imposed a small, but significant, non-transitory increase in the prices that it charges for such 
Warriors tickets.   
63. The geographic dimension of the sale of Warriors tickets through Primary Ticket 
Platforms is the San Francisco – Oakland – Fremont Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  It is in 
this area that most Warriors fans who purchase Warriors tickets through Primary Ticket Platforms 
reside.  And it is in this area that the Warriors and Ticketmaster have the greatest ability to increase 
the prices of Warriors tickets sold over Primary Ticket Platforms.   Indeed, the Warriors could 
profitably impose (and have profitably imposed) a small, but significant, non-transitory increase in 
price of Warriors tickets sold over Primary Ticket Platforms to residents in the San Francisco – 
Oakland – Fremont MSA. 
64. Primary Ticket Platforms, like Ticketmaster, offer consumers the ability to purchase 
Warriors tickets anywhere in the United States.  Accordingly, an alternative geographic scope of the 
market for the sale of Warriors tickets through Primary Ticket Platforms is the U.S.  Regardless of 
whether the geographic dimension of this market is considered local or national, the Warriors wield 
market power in it. 
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B. Secondary Ticket Exchange Services for Warriors Tickets 
65. The provision of Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets is also a 
relevant market in this case.   
66. From the standpoint of both the seller of the secondary ticket and the purchaser of the 
resale ticket, there are no economic substitutes for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors 
tickets.    
67. From the reseller’s perspective, Secondary Ticket Exchange services provide the 
most, if not the only, efficient, cost-effective, and secure way to offer resale tickets to potential 
purchasers.   They likewise offer resellers and purchasers of resale tickets, respectively, the largest 
audience of prospective purchasers and the largest quantity and variety of tickets available for resale. 
In fact, because of search costs, concerns over reliability and economies of scale and scope, it would 
not be feasible to create or operate a meaningful secondary market in ticket resales without the 
intermediating presence of Secondary Ticket Exchanges.  
68. There are no economic substitutes for Secondary Ticket Exchange services both to 
the Warriors ticket holder reselling the ticket and the Warriors fan purchasing the resale ticket.  As 
with primary ticket purchasers, from the perspective of a Warriors resale ticket purchaser, there is no 
reasonable substitute for tickets to a Warriors game.  In other words, a price increase in Warriors 
tickets purchased by resale will not cause any significant number of consumers to purchase a 
Sacramento Kings (or any other NBA) tickets instead.  Thus, a hypothetical monopolist of 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets could profitably impose a small, but 
significant, non-transitory increase in the fees it charges for the distribution of Warriors tickets 
purchased by resale. 
69. There are several additional factors that further support the separate and distinct 
nature of the Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary Ticket Exchange services markets for Warriors 
tickets: 
 There is distinct demand for Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services, which allow for suppliers to provide one of them but not 
the other.  On the one hand, Paciolan (a competitor of Ticketmaster) provides 
only Primary Ticket Platform services, and not Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services, to certain NBA teams.  On the other hand, StubHub sells only 
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Secondary Ticket Exchange services, and not Primary Ticket Platform 
services, to NBA teams.   
  Primary Ticket Platform services and Secondary Ticket Exchange services for 
Warriors tickets are subject to distinct customer demand and pricing based on 
the inherent differences between primary tickets and tickets purchased by 
resale.  Primary tickets are sold by the team and priced by the team.  Resale 
tickets are sold by ticketholders and priced according to agreement between 
the reseller and buyer.  Furthermore, resale ticket purchases are often made 
because the primary tickets are sold out or otherwise unavailable at the desired 
price and location. 
  The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice recognized the existence 
of relevant and distinct Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services markets in its action to block the 2010 merger of 
Ticketmaster and Live Nation.  Indeed, the principal basis for the 
government’s action was that the proposed transaction was likely “to lessen 
competition substantially for primary ticketing services to major concert 
venues located in the United States . . . .”  The government separately 
identified a “secondary ticketing market” there, noting that “[s]econdary 
ticketing companies provide services that facilitate the resale of tickets . . . .” 
  The Federal Trade Commission likewise recognized a relevant and distinct 
market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services in its action against 
Ticketmaster for engaging in deceptive “bait-and-switch” steering of 
consumers to its Secondary Ticket Exchange platform.  The agency noted 
that, in addition to Ticketmaster’s business of providing “primary ticketing 
services,” it also provides “a ticket resale marketplace where consumers can 
buy event tickets that are being offered by resellers . . . on the so-called 
‘secondary market.’”  
  Ticketmaster also recognizes the distinct nature of these two markets.  In its 
2014 SEC Form 10-K, Ticketmaster/Live Nation identified the existence of a 
“secondary ticket sales market.”  
 
70. The geographic scope of the Secondary Ticket Exchange services market for 
Warriors tickets is the San Francisco – Oakland – Fremont MSA.  The majority of Warriors fans 
who purchase Warriors tickets through Secondary Ticket Exchanges reside in this area.  Moreover, a 
hypothetical monopolist of Secondary Ticket Exchange services could profitably impose a small, but 
significant, non-transitory increase in the fees charged to residents in the San Francisco – Oakland – 
Fremont MSA that use Secondary Ticket Exchange services both for the resale and the repurchase of 
Warriors tickets.  
71. Alternatively, the geographic dimension of the Secondary Ticket Exchange services 
market for Warriors tickets is the United States, inasmuch as some resellers of Warriors tickets on 
Secondary Ticket Exchanges reside throughout the United States.  Regardless of whether the 
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geographic dimension of this market is local or national, Defendants’ conduct has caused substantial 
anticompetitive effects, including the significant foreclosure of competition, reduced output and 
increased prices. 
VI. MARKET POWER 
72. The Warriors wield substantial market power over consumers seeking to purchase 
Warriors tickets sold through Primary Platform Services, including season ticket subscriptions.   
73. The Warriors – the issuer of all Warriors tickets and the entity responsible for putting 
the Warriors basketball team on the court – has substantial market power over the sale of Warriors 
tickets through Primary Ticket Platforms.  As stated above, there are no economic substitutes for 
Warriors games for fans of the Warriors.  This is particularly true, as there is no NBA franchise other 
than the Warriors in the San Francisco Bay area:  for Bay area residents to see live NBA action, they 
must attend Warriors games or otherwise travel significant distances.  Accordingly, the Warriors 
have substantial power over the prices charged for Warriors tickets.  And the Warriors have 
exercised this power historically by raising price, including by raising the price of Warriors season 
ticket packages for the 2015-2016 season by 30%. 
74. The Warriors economic power is also evidenced by its ability to force consumers to 
resell their Warriors tickets only on Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange.  As stated above, 
the Warriors have agreed with Ticketmaster – its exclusive Primary Ticket Platform and Secondary 
Ticket Exchange partner – to require Warriors season ticket holders to use Ticketmaster Secondary 
Ticket Exchange services exclusively.  The penalty for violating this policy is forfeiture of future 
season and playoff ticket packages to Warriors games.  As a result of this policy, numerous Warriors 
ticket holders have forgone using competitive Secondary Ticket Exchanges, such as StubHub, and 
have, instead, only used Ticketmaster.  This forcing is direct evidence of the market power of the 
Warriors.  
VII. HARM TO CONSUMERS, COMPETITION AND STUBHUB  
75. Defendants’ coordinated efforts to control the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services for Warriors tickets – based on their forcing of season ticket holders to use Ticketmaster 
exclusively for Secondary Ticket Exchange services; their monitoring of resale exchanges to ensure 
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compliance with their exclusive arrangement; their deceptive marketing and promotion; and their 
exclusive marketing, promotion and technical integration – has harmed competition, and threatens to 
harm competition even further.   
76. Defendants’ conduct has significantly limited, and threatens to significantly limit 
even further, the number of Secondary Ticket Exchange providers through which Warriors ticket 
holders can resell their tickets.  In the words of one season ticket holder whom the Warriors “forced 
[] to sell on the TM exchange only . . . [t]his is of course an attempt to control the market.” 
77. If Defendants have their way, there will be only one Secondary Ticket Exchange – 
Ticketmaster.  By reducing the Secondary Ticket Exchanges on which their Warriors ticket 
inventory may be listed, the Defendants are significantly limiting the ability of resellers to sell their 
tickets:  far fewer eyeballs review a reseller’s inventory when it is limited to posting such inventory 
on one, as opposed to, multiple exchanges.  Resellers have reported that they have suffered 
substantial, adverse economic consequences as a result of having their ticket inventory available 
only to potential buyers that visit Ticketmaster’s single (and inferior) Secondary Ticket Exchange. 
78. Indeed, by precluding resellers from using competitive Secondary Ticket Exchanges 
to sell their tickets – particularly, by limiting resellers from using StubHub, a trusted and superior 
distribution source – Defendants have caused resellers of Warriors tickets to lose sales altogether.  
This has reduced the output of Warriors ticket resales, including Warriors ticket resales that are 
completed through Secondary Ticket Exchanges. 
79. The reduced or complete lack of competition resulting from Defendants’ misconduct 
also subjects Warriors season ticket holders and other secondary ticket sellers to Ticketmaster’s 
supra-competitive Secondary Ticket Exchange service fees and associated charges.  As one season 
ticket holder, whom the Warriors cut off for selling through StubHub, so starkly put it:  “This is 
creating a very scary monopoly and eliminating competition that will only drive prices higher for the 
consumer.”   
80. This is especially true when one considers StubHub’s efforts to compete on price in 
order to attract resellers to its Secondary Ticket Exchange.  As The Wall Street Journal reported on 
March 25, 2014, StubHub has “lowered the fee it charges sellers.”  Due to Defendants’ forcing, 
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Warriors season ticket holders and other resellers cannot take advantage of StubHub’s lower fees, 
but must pay the artificially high Ticketmaster fees that are unconstrained by competition.  
81. This conduct also has harmed buyers of secondary Warriors tickets.  Defendants’ 
conduct has significantly limited, and threatens to significantly limit even further, the number of 
Secondary Ticket Exchange providers through which buyers of secondary Warriors tickets can make 
their secondary ticket purchases.  Again, if Defendants have their way, there will be only one such 
source of resale tickets – Ticketmaster.  Like the resellers of these tickets, purchasers of Warriors 
resale tickets are also subject to increased Secondary Ticket Exchange service fees and associated 
charges because of the reduced or complete lack of competition resulting from Defendants’ 
misconduct.  StubHub, on the other hand, attempts to vigorously compete on price in order to attract 
purchasers of secondary tickets to its Secondary Ticket Exchange.  In this regard, the Wall Street 
Journal article noted above stated that “StubHub has slashed buyer’s fees to as little as 2% from 
10% of the base ticket price.”  Due to Defendants’ forcing, purchasers of Warriors resale tickets 
cannot take advantage of StubHub’s lower fees, but rather must pay Ticketmaster’s substantially 
higher fees that are unconstrained by competition.    
82. Not only has Defendants’ exclusionary conduct harmed and distorted network   
competition in general, it also has harmed StubHub and other Secondary Ticket Exchange services 
providers specifically.  Defendants have foreclosed them from competing against Ticketmaster on 
the merits and have substantially increased their costs of attempting to compete on a level playing 
field.  
83. The benefits of the network “matchmaking” services that StubHub is able to provide 
to prospective resellers and buyers have been artificially diminished as a result of Defendants’ 
conduct.  This conduct has caused resellers to list a substantially smaller number of Warriors tickets 
on StubHub despite its superior pricing, service and reputation for offering a wide and desirable 
range of choices to purchasers.  This, in turn, has caused potential purchasers of Warriors tickets to 
frequent Stub Hub less often since these purchasers now find a substantially smaller volume and 
variety of Warriors tickets on the StubHub exchange.  In other words, Secondary Ticket Exchanges, 
such as StubHub, have incurred substantial harm as a direct result of the negative network effects 
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flowing from Defendants’ restrictive conduct.  These negative network effects will render it 
increasingly difficult, and ultimately impossible, for competing Secondary Ticket Exchanges to 
compete in offering Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets.  The spillover effects 
of these negative network effects will, in addition, make it increasingly difficult over time for them 
to compete in offering Exchange services for other types of tickets as well.  
84. Defendants’ conduct has had a substantial effect on StubHub’s business. Its inventory 
of Warriors tickets has decreased by approximately 80% compared to last year and the number of 
Warriors tickets sold through StubHub has decreased by more than 40%.  Defendants’ conduct 
threatens StubHub (and other Secondary Ticket Exchanges) with potentially even greater harm in the 
future.     
85. Defendants’ consumer forcing and foreclosure of competitive Secondary Ticket 
Exchange Services has artificially increased Defendants’ share of Warriors tickets sold through 
Secondary Ticket Exchanges to, at a minimum, in excess of 50%. 
86. This is not just a problem for Warriors fans.  It is a looming threat for all sports fans.  
If Defendants’ misconduct is allowed to continue, Ticketmaster and other sports franchises will have 
the economic incentive to engage in similar anticompetitive efforts to artificially reduce competition 
in the Secondary Ticket Exchange services for their respective teams’ tickets.  These franchises will 
do this in order to secure additional profits that they could not obtain in a competitive resale market.  
The network effects that would likely be caused by repetition of this conduct will substantially 
exacerbate the harm to Secondary Ticket Exchanges, such as StubHub, potentially causing the 
market to tip irrevocably in favor of Ticketmaster thereby enabling it to exercise unconstrained 
power over service fees and quality of service, resulting in significant harm both to resellers and 
purchasers of tickets on Secondary Ticket Exchanges. 
VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
FIRST CLAIM 
Section 1 Unlawful Tying (Per Se or Rule of Reason) 
87. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein. 
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88. Defendants’ conduct in foreclosing competition in Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services for Warriors tickets constitutes an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
89. Warriors tickets sold over Primary Ticket Platforms and Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services for Warriors tickets are distinct and separate products that compete in distinct and separate 
markets.   
90. The Warriors possess substantial market power over the sale of Warriors tickets sold 
through Primary Ticket Platforms.  For those seeking to purchase primary Warriors tickets, there is 
no other option but to make these purchases through Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform.  
91. The Warriors and Ticketmaster have agreed to unlawfully tie the use of 
Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange to the sale of Warriors tickets through Ticketmaster’s 
Primary Ticket Platform.  Defendants have actually cancelled or threatened to cancel season ticket 
subscriptions to the Warriors – which make up a large percentage of the Warriors’ primary ticket 
purchasers – unless season ticket holders agree to use Ticketmaster exclusively for Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services.  Defendants have also revoked, or threatened to revoke, their continued sale of 
Warriors primary tickets to season ticket holders if they are identified as reselling their primary 
tickets through any Secondary Ticket Exchange provider other than Ticketmaster.  As a result of this 
tying arrangement, ticket holders of the Warriors have been forced to use Ticketmaster for 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services. 
92. This tying arrangement – which has been reinforced and strengthened by the 
Warrior’s exclusive marketing, promotion and integration of Ticketmaster for Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services – has substantially foreclosed StubHub and other Secondary Ticket Exchange 
providers from competing in the Secondary Ticket Exchange services market for Warriors tickets.  It 
has harmed and will continue to harm competition in that market by forcing Secondary Ticket 
Exchange buyers and sellers to pay artificially high fees for Secondary Ticket Exchange services and 
by reducing the quantity and quality of secondary Warriors tickets available for sale.  It has reduced 
output in that market as well. 
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93. There are no legitimate business justifications or efficiencies for Defendants’ tying 
arrangements that counterbalance their demonstrated anticompetitive effects.  
94. This tying arrangement constitutes a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1, per se, under a “quick look” standard, and under the rule of reason.  
95. As a result of Defendants’ illegal tying arrangement, the fees on both the buyer and 
seller side for Warriors Secondary Ticket Exchange services as well as ticket prices for Warriors 
resale tickets have been artificially raised above competitive levels.   
96. As a result of Defendants’ illegal tying arrangement, StubHub has been and will 
continue to be injured in its business and property in an amount not presently known with precision 
but which is, at minimum, millions of dollars prior to trebling. 
SECOND CLAIM 
 
Section 1 Restraint of Trade 
(Per se or Rule of Reason) 
97. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein. 
98. Defendants have restrained trade through a series of coordinated agreements and acts, 
including:  Defendants’ actions to force Warriors season ticket holders to exclusively use 
Ticketmaster Secondary Ticket Exchange services and Defendants’ agreement to exclusively market 
and promote Ticketmaster for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets and for 
Ticketmaster to be the exclusive integrated provider of Secondary Ticket Exchange services to the 
Warriors. 
99. There are no legitimate business justifications or efficiencies for Defendants’ 
coordinated agreements and acts that would counterbalance their demonstrated anticompetitive 
effects.  
100. Defendants’ coordinated agreements and acts are being undertaken with the common 
design to exclude and eliminate competing Secondary Ticket Exchange providers, such as StubHub, 
and entrench Ticketmaster as the sole source of secondary Warriors tickets.  They are also for the 
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purpose of controlling the supply and prices of Warriors tickets available by resale and the fees that 
are charged for Secondary Ticket Exchange services.   
101. These coordinated agreements and acts of Defendants constitute violations of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, per se, under a “quick look” standard, and under the rule of 
reason.  
102. As a result of Defendants’ coordinated agreements and acts, competition in the 
market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets has been diminished and 
eliminated.  
103. As a result of Defendants’ coordinated agreements and acts, the fees on both the 
buyer and seller side for Warriors Secondary Ticket Exchange services have been artificially raised 
above competitive levels.   
104. As a result of Defendants’ coordinated agreements and acts, StubHub has been and 
will continue to be injured in its business and property in an amount not presently known with 
precision but which is, at minimum, millions of dollars prior to trebling. 
THIRD CLAIM 
Conspiracy to Monopolize 
105. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein. 
106. Defendants’ conduct in foreclosing competition in the Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services market for Warriors tickets constitutes a conspiracy to monopolize the Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services market for Warriors tickets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2.   
107. To foreclose competition in the market for Warriors tickets sold through Secondary 
Ticket Exchange services, Defendants have coordinated their efforts to force season ticket holders to 
use Ticketmaster as their exclusive provider of Secondary Ticket Exchange services; monitor 
compliance with their restrictive policies; exclusively and deceptively market and promote 
Ticketmaster; and/or preclude competitor Secondary Ticket Exchanges from integrating with the 
Warriors’ Primary Ticket Platform (i.e., Ticketmaster).  Defendants have willfully, knowingly and 
Case3:15-cv-01436-VC   Document1   Filed03/29/15   Page28 of 35
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 -28- COMPLAINT
  Case No. 
 
with specific intent to do so, combined or conspired to monopolize the Warriors Secondary Ticket 
Exchange services market.   
108. If Defendants’ exclusionary conduct is not enjoined, there is a dangerous likelihood 
that defendants will monopolize the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange services for Warriors 
tickets. 
109. There are no legitimate efficiency benefits that counterbalance the demonstrated 
anticompetitive effects of these overt acts, including their foreclosure of competition in the Warriors 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services market. 
110. As a result of Defendants’ violation of Section 2, StubHub has been and will continue 
to be injured in its business and property in an amount not presently known with precision but which 
is, at minimum, millions of dollars prior to trebling. 
FOURTH CLAIM 
Violation of the Cartwright Act 
111. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein.   
112. Defendant’s coordinated efforts to foreclose competition in the market for Secondary 
Ticket Exchange services for Warriors tickets constitute a violation of the Cartwright Act. 
113. Defendants have been able to accomplish this violation because of the individual and 
collective market power that the Warriors and Ticketmaster wield over the sale of Warriors tickets 
through Primary Ticket Platforms. 
114. Defendants’ coordinated efforts to force season ticket holders to use Ticketmaster as 
their exclusive provider of Secondary Ticket Exchange services; monitor compliance with their 
restrictive policies; exclusively market and promote Ticketmaster; and/or preclude competitor 
Secondary Ticket Exchanges from integrating with the Warriors’ Primary Ticket Platform (i.e., 
Ticketmaster) has achieved and will achieve no legitimate efficiency benefits to counterbalance their 
demonstrated anticompetitive effects, including the foreclosure of competition in the Warriors 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services market. 
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115. Defendants’ conspiracy to monopolize the Secondary Ticket Exchange services 
market for Warriors tickets also constitutes a violation of the Cartwright Act.   
116. As a result of Defendants’ violation of the Cartwright Act, StubHub has been and will 
continue to be injured in its business and property in an amount not presently known with precision 
but which is, at minimum, millions of dollars prior to trebling. 
FIFTH CLAIM 
Violation of California UCL Section 17200 
117. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein.   
118. Ticketmaster has used additional, unfair practices to make it difficult for ticket 
holders to sell their tickets on competitive Secondary Ticket Exchanges, such as StubHub.  
Ticketmaster has done this by levering its position as a dominant provider of Primary Ticket 
Platform 
119. As found by the Department of Justice, Ticketmaster has historically dominated 
Primary Ticket Platform services.  It has maintained its dominance in this business by entering into 
numerous multi-year, exclusive contracts with leagues, teams, and venues.  Indeed, Ticketmaster’s 
market power in Primary Ticket Platform services is evidenced by the high fees that it has charged 
and continues to charge for Primary Platform services – fees that are substantially higher than fees 
charged by other Primary Ticket Platform competitors.   
120. Moreover, Ticketmaster’s market power in Primary Ticket Platform services is 
buttressed by high barriers to entry and expansion in this business, including barriers created by 
Ticketmaster threats to enforce its multi-year, exclusive agreements.  Ticketmaster has, for example, 
threatened action against StubHub for even approaching Ticketmaster business partners with offers 
to sell additional, unsold ticket inventory, claiming that such overtures would constitute tortiously 
interfering with Ticketmaster’s exclusive contracts.  Specifically, Ticketmaster cautioned StubHub 
that:  “It has come to our attention that StubHub is approaching Ticketmaster clients seeking to sell 
our client’s primary tickets.  As is well known in the industry. . . Ticketmaster’s client ticketing 
contracts are generally exclusive and therefore contain contractual commitments by our clients not to 
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sell primary tickets through any third-party.”  Ticketmaster has likewise imposed contractual 
restrictions in its Primary Ticket Platform contracts that preclude teams, leagues, and venues from 
distributing any of their ticket inventory via actual or potential competitors. 
121. Specifically, Ticketmaster exercised its dominance in Primary Ticket Platform 
services by delaying the delivery of the electronic copy of the originally purchased, primary ticket or 
the barcode associated with that ticket to the primary ticket purchaser.   Ticketmaster has chosen to 
delay the delivery of PDF images or barcodes associated with original, primary tickets for numerous 
sporting events and musical concerts until weeks or months after the ticket was purchased and only a 
few days before the relevant event.   
122. This practice makes it extremely difficult for a primary ticket purchaser to resell his 
or her ticket on competitive non-Ticketmaster Secondary Ticket Exchanges.  Indeed, the delaying of 
the delivery of these tickets or bar codes effectively bars the reseller from selling that ticket on a 
competitive Secondary Ticket Exchange.  This is because ticket purchasers are reluctant to purchase 
a ticket on a Secondary Ticket Exchange from a stranger (with no brand recognition) on the hope 
that the reseller will transfer the tickets weeks or months after a secondary ticket purchase occurs.  
123. Of course, Ticketmaster facilitates secondary purchases on its own Secondary Ticket 
Exchange even before delivering the primary ticket to the reseller:  it guarantees that it will directly 
deliver the ticket to the secondary purchaser at the designated delivery time, likely a few days before 
the event, if a secondary transaction is made.  StubHub and other competitive Secondary Ticket 
Exchanges cannot provide this same direct delivery guarantee because they are barred from 
electronically integrating with Ticketmaster’s Primary Ticket Platform.   
124. Accordingly, this Ticketmaster practice of delaying delivery of primary tickets has 
caused ticket holders to incur consumer harm and has caused competitive foreclosure to Secondary 
Ticket Exchanges.  
125. At a recent sports analytics conference held at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Sloan School of Business, representatives of Ticketmaster stated that Ticketmaster will 
be rolling out these ticket and barcode delivery delay tactics even more expansively in the near 
future.   
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126. Another tactic in which Ticketmaster has engaged to leverage its dominance in 
Primary Ticket Platform services is its increased issuance of so-called paperless tickets.  These 
virtual tickets allow entry to the game or event only upon showing at the gate picture identification 
and the credit card used for the purchase.  Transferring or reselling these tickets is only possible 
through Ticketmaster’s Secondary Ticket Exchange platform.  According to the independent 
American Antitrust Institute, “[i]nstead of benefiting consumers, the trend favoring paperless tickets 
appears to be motivated by a desire of the dominant primary ticket provider to block out competition 
in the secondary ticket (resale) market.”   
127. These practices are unlawful business acts or practices within the meaning of Section 
17200 of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”). 
128. Moreover, Defendants’ (i) entering into an agreement under which Ticketmaster is 
the exclusive provider of Secondary Ticket Exchange services which the Warriors market and 
promote and which are technically integrated with the Primary Ticket Platform services that the 
Warriors use;  (ii) forcing Warriors season ticket holders to use Ticketmaster exclusively for 
Secondary Ticket Exchange services, and threatening to retaliate against those that do not comply; 
and (iii) monitoring compliance with their restrictive policies are all unfair business acts or practices 
within the meaning of Section 17200 of California’s Unfair Competition Law. 
129. Such unfair competitive practices are ongoing and continue to date.   
130. Defendants’ unfair business practices have caused substantial economic injury to 
StubHub in an amount not presently known with precision but which is, at minimum, hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. 
131. Such unlawful or unfair business practices are continuing and will continue unless 
relief enjoining these practices is granted under Section 17204 of the UCL.  StubHub has no 
adequate remedy at law. 
SIXTH CLAIM 
Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage 
132. StubHub repeats and realleges each and every allegation of this Complaint as if fully 
set forth herein.   
Case3:15-cv-01436-VC   Document1   Filed03/29/15   Page32 of 35
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
 
 -32- COMPLAINT
  Case No. 
 
133. StubHub provides Secondary Ticket Exchange services to buyers and sellers of 
secondary Warriors tickets. 
134. Defendants have knowingly and intentionally interfered with StubHub’s prospective 
economic advantage by improperly and illegally engaging in the conspiratorial conduct described 
above.  In particular, Defendants have forced Warriors season ticket holders, who regularly use 
StubHub for Secondary Ticket Exchange services, to stop using StubHub for these services and 
exclusively use the Secondary Ticket Exchange services of Ticketmaster instead.  Defendants have 
done this by withholding or threatening to withhold season ticket or playoff ticket subscriptions if 
Warriors season ticket holders choose to sell through StubHub.  Defendant Ticketmaster has also 
delayed delivery of PDF-imaged tickets or ticket barcodes to interfere with StubHub’s prospective 
business relations with resellers and buyers of secondary tickets.  And Defendant Ticketmaster has 
issued paperless tickets to events that cannot be transferred through competitive Second Ticket 
Exchanges. 
135. StubHub has been and will be harmed in its business and property as a result of 
Defendants’ tortious interference, losing sales and profits from its regular customers that it otherwise 
would have received but for Defendants’ tortious interference with these prospective sales.   
136. Defendants’ conduct is malicious, oppressive, and done with the sole intent of 
harming StubHub. 
137. Defendants’ conduct is without justification or privilege. 
138. As a result of Defendants’ tortious interference with StubHub’s prospective economic 
advantage, StubHub has been injured in its business and property in an amount not presently known 
with precision but which is, at minimum, millions of dollars prior to trebling. 
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, StubHub requests the following relief: 
139. That the Court declare, adjudge and decree that Defendants have committed the 
violations of the Sherman Act, the Cartwright Act, the UCL and state law against tortious 
interference with prospective economic advantage alleged herein;  
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140. That Defendants, their affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees, and the officers, 
directors, partners, agents and employees thereof, and all other persons acting or claiming to act on 
their behalf or in concert with them, be permanently enjoined and restrained from in any manner 
continuing, maintaining, or renewing the conduct alleged herein, or conduct having a similar purpose 
or effect;  
141. That the Court enter an order enjoining Defendants from continuing to implement 
their coordinated efforts to foreclose competition in the market for Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services for Warriors tickets, and specifically enjoining them from taking any actions which force 
Warriors season ticket holders to use Ticketmaster exclusively for Secondary Ticket Exchange 
services for Warriors tickets or punish season ticket holders for using StubHub or any other 
Secondary Ticket Exchange provider for these services, or from entering into any contracts or 
agreements having a similar purpose or effect; 
142. That StubHub be awarded money damages, in an amount to be proven at trial and to 
be trebled according to law, plus interest, to compensate StubHub for Defendants’ violations of 
federal and state antitrust law; 
143. That StubHub recover its cost of suit, including a reasonable attorneys’ fee, and for 
such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.   
X. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
144. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. 
Dated:  March 29, 2015 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Stephen V. Bomse 
Shannon  C. Leong 
ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 
405 Howard Street 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
sbomse@orrick.com 
sleong@orrick.com 
/s/ Stephen V. Bomse 
STEPHEN V. BOMSE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
StubHub, Inc. 
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Dated:  March 29, 2015 
 
Matthew L. Cantor 
Gordon Schnell 
Allison F. Sheedy 
CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP 
335 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10017 
(212) 350-2738 
(212) 350-2701 (fax) 
mcantor@constantinecannon.com 
gschnell@constantinecannon.com 
asheedy@constantinecannon.com 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff StubHub, Inc. 
(Pro Hac Vice Admission Pending) 
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